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Abstract
Objective: The current study tests whether jury-eligible adults follow judicial
instructions to disregard information about a defendant’s pretrial competency status when
deciding whether he is guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. Hypotheses: It was anticipated,
because of the effects of hindsight bias, that defendants who were previously found competent to
stand trial would be less likely to be found NGRI than a defendant who previously was deemed
incompetent but has been restored to competency for trial. We also predicted that judicial
instructions to disregard pretrial competency status would not effectively eliminate the effect of
competency status without an accompanying explanation of why it was important to do so.
Method: An online convenience sample of jury eligible adults (N = 205) watched a mock trial
video in which we varied defendant competency status (competent vs. incompetent) and judicial
instructions on how to consider this evidence (no instructions vs. instructions only vs.
instructions with an explanation of legal rationale). Jurors gave their verdict (guilty vs. NGRI)
and completed a post-trial questionnaire. Results: There was a significant effect of competency
status; participants were more likely to render guilty verdicts when the defendant had always
been competent to stand trial than when the defendant initially had been found incompetent and
received restorative treatment. A similar pattern was found for participants’ ratings of whether
the defendant knew that his behavior was wrong and had the ability to comport his behavior with
the law. Standard instructions mitigated the biasing effects of competency to stand trial, which
was not the case when the instructions were accompanied by an explanation of the legal
standard. Conclusions: The pretrial competency status of a defendant affects jurors’ decisions
even though it is a legally impermissible consideration. Standard instructions may serve a
corrective function in improving juror adherence to legal standards. However, instructions which
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are too lengthy or too complicated may overwhelm jurors or draw more attention to the
irrelevant information, thus increasing its biasing effects.
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Examining the Impact of Competence to Stand Trial and Judicial Instructions on NGRI Verdicts
Implicit in the legal process is the belief that jurors are able to adequately understand and
apply legal standards. However, many of the standards which jurors are tasked with following
are written in complicated language and often require that jurors consider only very specific
information for very narrow purposes. The literature on hindsight bias indicates that it is
exceedingly difficult for individuals to discount irrelevant or inadmissible evidence once it has
been introduced, a phenomenon known as evidence fusion. This study expands the literature on
hindsight bias to insanity defense cases, particularly those in which the defendant was previously
found incompetent to stand trial. In these cases, jurors are aware that the defendant’s mental
illness was severe enough to require hospitalization prior to standing trial, which we hypothesize
will make them appear more mentally ill in the eyes of the jury. Although information on
defendants’ post arrest mental state is not relevant to decisions of criminal responsibility, we
predict that jurors’ lack of understanding of the appropriate legal standards governing use of
information places them at risk of misapplying this particularly salient information, resulting in
more Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) verdicts. On the other hand, knowledge that the
defendant was originally found competent to stand trial will decrease the perceived severity of
their mental illness, resulting in more Guilty verdicts. Judicial instructions explaining which
information is relevant for reaching a verdict, as well as why certain information should be
disregarded, may help decrease the biasing effect of this information by eliminating conflict
between how the jurors think the case should be adjudicated and what the legal standards dictate.
Competency to Stand Trial
Competency to stand trial is a legal construct defined by the United States Supreme Court
in the landmark case Dusky v. United States (1960). In its decision, the Court set the standard
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that a criminal defendant must have “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding, and…a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him” (Dusky v. United States, 1960 p. 402). This decision was intended
to protect mentally ill defendants who might jeopardize their freedom if they were to engage in
legal proceedings when their symptoms are so severe that they cannot comprehend the legal
process, understand their potential case outcomes, or act in their own best interests. In doing so,
it also ensures that the defendant’s due process rights are not violated by the state (Melton et al.,
2018).
Since the Dusky ruling was passed in 1960, the number of competency evaluations has
increased steadily to an average of 60,000 evaluations each year, making defendant competency
the most prevalent assessment issue in forensic mental health (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000). Previous
studies have found that attorneys typically doubt their client’s competence in approximately
14.8% of cases, choosing to seek an evaluation in 52.6% of these cases (Hoge et al., 1992). This
decision is often based on observations of overt signs of mental illness, such as disorganized
speech (Berman & Osborne, 1987). Of the individuals who are referred for assessment, roughly
27.5% are adjudicated incompetent (Pirelli et al., 2011). It is important to note that a competency
assessment is only concerned with the defendant’s current mental state. Findings from this
evaluation are not relevant and should not be used when making decisions concerning criminal
responsibility or predicting future dangerousness.
Under the Dusky ruling, a defendant whose competence is in question would be
evaluated by two independent experts who then advise the judge as to the individual’s current
ability to participate in the legal process. Ultimately, it is up to the judge to decide, based on the
findings of the forensic evaluators, whether the defendant meets the Dusky criteria. If a judge
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determines that defendants are in fact incompetent to stand trial, they will be remanded to a
psychiatric facility to receive restorative treatment. The goal of this treatment is not to cure them
of all symptoms of mental illness but simply to improve their functioning to the point that they
meet the Dusky criteria and their trial can proceed. Once the defendant is deemed competent to
stand trial, they will return to court to complete the legal process.
There is currently a dearth of empirical research examining how previously incompetent
defendants are perceived by the jury once they are restored and proceed to trial. Incompetent
defendants often suffer from severe mental illness or intellectual disability, making them perhaps
the most vulnerable individuals in the incarcerated population. As such, it is of vital importance
that we ensure these defendants receive fair treatment under the law, and that the information on
their mental state post-arrest does not bias the jury. This is especially true when these defendants
plead Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, as these two legal concepts are similar but ultimately
distinct.
Insanity Defense
The insanity defense is based on the legal concept of mens rea, which means “guilty
mind.” In the legal system, mens rea refers to the idea that to be found guilty an individual must
have the capacity to both understand the repercussions of their actions and the intention to
perform them anyway. Much like the question of defendant competency, the question of a
defendant’s sanity is only concerned with their behavior during a specific time period. The legal
verdict of NGRI refers only to the individual’s mental state at the time of the offense. Current or
previous signs of mental illness should not be considered when determining criminal
responsibility.
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The idea of legal insanity dates back to ancient Greek and Hebrew civilizations (Melton
et al., 2018) and has continued to evolve over the years. The first formalized definition was given
in England by Justice Tracy in 1723, who stated that in order to be found insane, “…a man must
be totally deprived of his understanding and memory so as not to know what he is doing, no
more than an infant, brute or wild beast” (as cited in Melton et al., 2018, p. 201). The first legal
standard for insanity was the M’Naghten rule. Based on the case of Daniel M’Naghten, whose
failed attempt at assassinating the Prime Minister resulted in the murder of his private secretary,
the House of Lords announced the new rule, stating, “At the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong” (R v. M’Naghten, 1843). This rule was widely criticized for its
rigidity in focusing only on cognitive impairment and lack of consideration of defendants’
abilities to control their behavior, which lead to several attempts at reform (Melton et al., 2018;
Ogloff, 1991).
In the United States, this reform produced another competing standard known as the
irresistible impulse test, which excused offenders from criminal responsibility when their mental
illness was so severe that it was seen as the sole cause of their criminal behavior and had stripped
them of the agency to control their actions (Melton et al., 2018). This irresistible impulse
standard was also criticized for its narrow view, and the issue was again subjected to several
rounds of reform. Finally, in 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) published Model Penal
Code 401, which read, “A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
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the law” (as cited in Melton et al., 2018, p. 203). The ALI rule was designed to combine the
ideas underlying the M’Naghten rule and the irresistible impulse test, while also avoiding their
all or nothing approach.
Today, 14 states have adopted the ALI rule, 28 use a derivation of the M’Naghten rule
which considers cognitive impairment only, 3 use their own combination of M’Naghten and the
irresistible impulse test, and 4 have no insanity defense at all (Melton et al., 2018). Although the
legal system has made considerable efforts to clarify and improve the precise definition of the
insanity defense, these changes are irrelevant if the standards are not appropriately applied by
jurors. Therefore, it is important to understand how well jurors can comprehend the guidelines by
which they are to reach a verdict, and if they are able to put aside their own beliefs and values to
apply legal standards in a fair and objective manor.
Juror Comprehension of Legal Standards
Jury research has found that there is a pervasive lack of understanding of legal standards,
both in general and specifically in regard to insanity defense cases. Thomas (2010) polled jurors
from three different courts in various counties in England and found that the percentages of
jurors who reported that they easily understood the instructions on the legal standard for selfdefense and actual bodily harm were 68%, 69% and 49%. However, when the researchers asked
jurors to identify the two questions the legal standard specifically addressed, only 31% of
participants answered correctly. Another study used participants who had been called for jury
duty in Michigan and compared the comprehension rates for substantive and procedural law
between those who served on a civil or criminal case (received instructions) and those who did
not serve (did not receive instructions; Reifman et al., 1992). All groups scored below 50%
comprehension, with no significant difference between instructed jurors and uninstructed jurors
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on understanding of the legal standards. During deliberation, several juries asked the judge for
additional information on the substantive laws relating to their case, which raised the average
comprehension rate to 67%, an improvement over the performance of those who simply asked
for the instructions to be repeated (45%) and those who did not request help (31%). However,
participants were hardly ever aware of their ignorance, indicating that they did not know the
standard only 10% (criminal cases), 11% (civil cases), and 18% (non-jurors) of the time
(Reifman et al., 1992). This false sense of certainty is problematic, as it begs the question of how
to make jurors aware of what they do not know so that the judge can correct their
misconceptions. The researchers speculated that jurors were intimidated by the judge in the
courtroom and were not aware that they have the option to ask questions, resulting in the feeling
that they need to simply do the best their best with the given information (Reifman et al., 1992).
The researchers recommend that judges explicitly instruct jurors that they may ask questions and
encourage them to do so throughout the process.
This lack of juror understanding is just as prevalent in insanity cases (Arens et al., 1965;
Elwork et al., 1987; Ogloff, 1991). Juror comprehension of insanity defense standards ranges
from 31% to 40% (Arens et al., 1965). Even when the insanity defense standards were rewritten
for maximum understanding, comprehension rose only to 51%, only slightly better than chance
(Elwork et al., 1987). The repercussions of this lack of understanding are clearly demonstrated in
a study that compared the distribution of mock juror verdicts among participants who read either
the M’Naghten rule, ALI rule, or received no instruction on how to consider insanity cases
(Ogloff, 1991). Ogloff hypothesized that there would be more NGRI verdicts when the ALI rule
was used as it “provides for relief from criminal responsibility for both cognitive and volitional
reasons” (Ogloff, 1991, p. 510). However, there was no difference in verdict between conditions.
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Ogloff (1991) concluded that the participants were not using the official legal standards because
they were too complicated for them to understand and apply; thus, participants based their
decision on their own internal beliefs and understanding.
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that jurors have an exceedingly difficult time
applying the legal standards dictating exactly how they are to reach a verdict. For insanity
defense cases in particular, juror confusion results in a reliance on personal understanding and
beliefs about mental illness and criminal responsibility, placing jurors at risk for misapplying
irrelevant but particularly salient information. It is imperative that researchers and legal scholars
gain an understanding of the processes by which jurors consider information presented during
trial, in order to develop debiasing techniques which can adequately correct the legal process.
Hindsight Bias
Hindsight bias is a psychological phenomenon in which knowledge of the outcome of a
situation significantly increases the perceived inevitability of that particular event occurring in
the first place (Fischhoff, 1975). People are not aware of the effect hindsight bias has on their
decision-making process, and therefore have a very difficult time imagining how they would
have viewed a particular situation without prior knowledge of its outcome (Fischhoff, 1975).
This inability to disregard irrelevant and often biasing information has robust and welldocumented effects on jurors’ decisions in both civil and criminal cases (Casper et al., 1988;
Smith & Greene, 2005; Steblay et al., 2006). In one study, undergraduates acted as jurors in a
case in which the plaintiff was suing the local police department for damages following an illegal
search of his apartment (Casper et al., 1988). The participants were assigned to three conditions
that differed on the reported outcome of the search: one found no evidence of illegal activity, one
uncovered a stash of illegal drugs, and one did not report the outcome of the search. Participants
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were then asked to award damages to the plaintiff. Although the outcome of the search had no
relevance as to its legality, mock jurors were unable to disregard this information when making
their decision, as indicated by the significantly lower damage awards in the guilty (drugs
discovered) condition than both the innocent and not stated conditions (Casper et al., 1988). A
similar study examined the impact that knowledge of the extent of the defendant’s carelessness
and the plaintiff’s injury severity would have on judgments of liability and damage awards in a
civil negligence case (Smith & Greene, 2005). According to the law, judgements of negligence
are based only on an appraisal of the defendant’s behavior. However, mock jurors who were
aware that the plaintiff was seriously injured increased the degree of negligence that they
assigned to the defendant’s behavior. Likewise, knowledge of the degree of carelessness with
which the defendant acted resulted in increased damages awarded to the plaintiff when compared
to jurors who knew only the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, the only relevant information for
such a decision. These findings clearly indicate that the jurors were fusing, or misapplying,
information that was presented at other points in the trial process and intended to be used for
other legal decisions (Smith & Greene, 2005).
This inability to disregard prejudicial information is not limited to evidence that is legally
presented. In a meta-analysis of 48 studies, exposure to inadmissible, pro-prosecution evidence
resulted in significantly higher conviction rates than in cases where no exposure occurs (Steblay
et al., 2006). This effect is still significant even when the testimony is immediately challenged
and thrown out. (Steblay et al., 2006).
Taken together, these findings speak to the impact of hindsight bias on legal decision
making. Clearly, jurors struggle to disregard irrelevant, or even inadmissible, evidence when
forming their verdicts, demonstrating a pervasive inability to imagine how they would have

COMPETENCE, JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS, AND NGRI VERDICTS

12

viewed the issue without exposure to the biasing information. When considering an issue such as
the insanity defense, which is already poorly understood (Arens et al., 1965; Elwork et al., 1987),
it follows logically that the effects of hindsight bias would be present to the same, if not greater,
degree. As jurors struggle to make sense of the complicated legal standards, they often end up
using their own personal understanding of insanity (Ogloff, 1991), potentially placing them at
greater risk of misapplying particularly salient but legally irrelevant information. For cases in
which the defendant was originally adjudicated incompetent to stand trial, this knowledge may
result in an increased likelihood that the jury finds them NGRI. As laypeople, jurors cannot be
expected to understand that a defendant may have been sane at the time of the crime and severely
mentally ill at the time of trial, and vice versa. It is important to understand how knowledge of
the defendant’s mental state after arrest affects how juries make sense of their mental state at the
time of the offense to ensure the legal system is dispensing fair and just verdicts. Further, a
deeper understanding of how jurors interpret and apply information is necessary to continue to
develop legal practices and debiasing techniques.
Judicial Instructions as a Debiasing Technique
Instructions from the judge are intended to direct and guide the jury as they consider the
evidence before them and make an ultimate verdict. However, much like the case of legal
standards, juries are often unsuccessful at comprehending, remembering, and applying judicial
instructions (Ogloff, 1999; Simon, 2012; Smith, 1993; Smith & Greene, 2005; Steblay et al.,
2006). Simon (2012) summarizes the problem by saying, “Jury instructions are often complex,
couched in alien terminology, and demanding of unfamiliar and even improbable mental
exercises” (p. 174). Jurors often bring their own set of beliefs and schemas into the courtroom,
making decisions based on these ideas rather than the legal standards or instructions from the
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judge (Ogloff, 1991; Smith, 1993). For example, jurors who received instructions to disregard
their pre-existing ideas and not to judge the crime based on how closely it resembled a
stereotypical kidnapping performed no better than jurors who did not receive these instructions
(Smith, 1993). In the previously discussed study on hindsight bias in civil negligence cases,
judicial instructions on what information was relevant did not reduce evidence fusion (Smith &
Greene, 2005). A similar study also based on a civil negligence case found that explicit warnings
about and encouragements to resist the effects of hindsight bias were ineffective (Kamin &
Rachlinski, 1995). A finding of no difference between instructed and uninstructed jurors may in
fact be the best-case scenario. In a meta-analyses, instructions to disregard inadmissible
evidence actually increased its biasing effect (Steblay et al., 2006). Henderson instructions
(given to aid in assessing quality of eye-witness identifications) create a skepticism effect where
all eyewitness testimony is seen as inaccurate (Dillon et al., 2017).
Judicial instructions with a rationale explaining why certain information should be
ignored or considered are more effective than instructions alone (Eichorn, 1989; Steblay et al,
2006; Wissler et al., 2001). In cases of civil negligence, judicial instructions not to discount
damage awards when unsure of the defendants’ liability (because then plaintiffs would not
receive as much as they should) and not to increase damages when actions were clearly negligent
as a way to punish the defendant (because then plaintiff would receive more than they should)
decreased bias in both cases (Wissler et al., 2001). Likewise, instructions to disregard
inadmissible information had the greatest effect when accompanied by an explanation that the
findings either had no bearing, were not relevant, or were unreliable (Steblay et al., 2006). An
explanation of the rationale behind the legal standard helps to eliminate conflict between what
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the jurors feel is right and what the law dictates (Eichorn, 1989). Essentially, a clear explanation
helps the jury to understand the law and put aside their pre-existing beliefs.
Present Study
The present study examined how knowledge that a defendant was previously found
incompetent to stand trial affects juror decision making when considering an NGRI. We
hypothesized that jurors who are aware that the defendant was found competent to stand trial will
be more likely to find the defendant guilty due to misapplication of this information resulting
from the effects of hindsight bias. Despite the fact that competency to stand trial is irrelevant to
decisions of criminal responsibility, we predicted that jurors would be unable to disregard this
information, thus viewing the defendant as less mentally ill than would jurors who were told the
defendant was found incompetent and required hospitalization. We also hypothesized that the
effects of competency findings would be moderated by judicial instructions. We predicted that
instructions coupled with an explanation of why competency findings are not relevant to the
NGRI decision will successfully eliminate the effects of pretrial competency status on jurors’
decisions but that standard instructions that did not include an explanation would not.
Method
Participants
Based on a priori power analysis, the study requires a minimum of 158 participants to
detect a medium effect with a 0.05 alpha and 0.80 power. To account for missing data, 240 (40
per cell) jury eligible adults were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and
compensated $5.00 each for their time. We excluded 2 participants due to incomplete data, 2
who reported technical difficulties which prevented them from receiving the manipulations, 1
who failed attention checks, and 30 who failed the manipulation check for competency to stand
trial. These exclusions resulted in a final sample size N=205, with cell sizes of either 34 or 35.
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We chose not to exclude participants based on failing the judicial instruction manipulation check,
as only 38% of participants were able to correctly indicate which instructions they heard. This
finding is likely reflective of the lack of juror comprehension that has been well established in
the literature on judicial instructions (Ogloff, 1999; Simon, 2012; Smith, 1993; Smith & Greene,
2005; Steblay et al., 2006). However, it is still possible these instructions may act to
subconsciously mitigate the effects of competency, and so it is appropriate, and in keeping with
recent recommendations for jury research (Cullen & Monds, 2020), to include these data in our
analyses.
The participants ranged in age from 24 to 76 (M = 44.22, SD = 11.741). 52.7% of the
participants identified as female (108 female, 95 male, 2 other – non-binary) and a majority of
the sample identified as White or European American (84.9% White, 6.8% Black or African
American, 5.9% Asian, 2% Hispanic or Latinx, and 0.5% other).
Design
The design of the study had a fully crossed 3 (Instructions: none vs. instructions only vs.
instructions with explanation) x 2 (Competency: incompetent vs. competent) between-subjects
factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. The independent variables
are defendant competency and judicial instructions, and the dependent variables are juror verdict
and the opinions that contributed to their decision.
Materials
Participants watched a short summary of a mock trial in which the defendant robbed a
New York City bank (see Appendix A). The defendant reportedly displayed a knife to the bank
teller and left the premises with $200.00 cash. The case was designed to contain clear signs of
mental illness, including a documented history of psychiatric treatment, evidence of delusional
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thinking patterns, and odd behavior. However, we also included evidence of planning,
organization, and attempts to evade law enforcement to ensure the defendant’s symptoms are not
so severe that the participants immediately assumed that he meets the legal definition of insanity
(previous research in our lab with the same trial stimulus confirms that jurors’ perceive the
evidence as ambiguous). Participants were informed that the defendant was arrested shortly after
the crime and is charged with robbery in the first degree.
After the crime description, participants listened to the judge provide a brief explanation
of competency to stand trial. Participants then learned that the defendant was either found
competent and detained to await trial (competent condition) or found incompetent, treated in a
forensic psychiatric hospital until he was restored to competency, and then transferred to prison
to await trial (incompetent condition). Participants then watched excerpts from the trial
containing conflicting testimony from expert witnesses in which the defense psychologist argued
that the defendant was legally insane, while the psychologist retained by the prosecution argued
that the defendant was legally sane. Finally, participants in the two debiasing conditions heard
judicial instructions adapted from “Criminal Jury Instructions” (n.d.), in which they were either
simply told that information on competency to stand trial was not to be considered in their
verdict on sanity (instruction only condition), or were given this same instruction along with an
explanation that, as information on competency may create bias for or against the defendant, it is
important that this information should not be considered to avoid an unfair verdict (instructions
and explanation condition). Participants who were assigned to the no instruction condition
proceeded from the trial summary directly to the verdict step.
Participants rendered a verdict (Guilty or NGRI). Once this information was collected,
participants answered a series of 5 questions in which they indicated on a 7-point Likert scale the
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extent to which they agreed with statements addressing core issues underlying the legal
definition of insanity (R indicates variables which were reverse coded so that higher scores
indicated higher perceptions of sanity): (1) “the defendant was able to control his behavior,” (2)
“the defendant understood that his actions were wrong,” (3 – R) “the crime was a direct result of
the defendant’s mental illness,” (4) “the defendant understood the consequences of his actions,”
(5 – R) “the defendant has a serious mental illness.” We subjected this data to a principal axis
factor analysis with varimax rotation, which indicated that all five variables had loadings > .4
onto a single factor that appeared to measure participants’ perceptions of defendant sanity. We
averaged the five variables to create a scale measuring the extent to which the defendant was
viewed as sane (Cronbach’s alpha = .905). Analyses indicated that removal of variable five (“the
defendant has a serious mental illness”) increased the reliability and so it was deleted from the
model, resulting in a final Cronbach’s alpha = .926.
Finally, participants answered four multiple-choice, forced answer questions probing
them on the defendant’s charges, what diagnosis he received, his competency status, and what
instructions they received from the judge. These questions served as manipulation and attention
checks.
Procedure
Participants received the survey through the online platform, MTurk. Participants read a
short description of the study, stating that they will be asked some questions about a mock trial to
gain insight into jury decision making. They electronically signed an informed consent form, and
the website directed them to the first page of the survey. Once participants completed the study,
they read an electronic debriefing form and received their compensation through MTurk.
Results
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Data Analytic Strategy
We analyzed participant’s dichotomous verdict decisions using a binary logistic
regression with the main effects of defendant competency status (with NCST as the reference
condition) and judicial instructions (with Instructions Only as the reference condition) and their
interaction entered simultaneously. We also conducted a univariate Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) test to compare the effects of the independent variables on participant ratings of
defendant sanity. Based on our a priori hypotheses that instructions would moderate the effect of
defendant competency status, we performed tests of the simple effects of competency status
within instruction type.
Verdict
The logistic regression revealed a significant main effect of competency status (see Table
1). This finding indicates that the odds a participant would find the defendant guilty were 3.7
times greater in the CST conditions (42.2%) than in the NCST conditions (23.3%). Instructions
did not have a significant effect on verdict, either as a main effect or in interaction with
competency status.
Table 1. Effects of Manipulated Variables on Guilty Verdicts
95% CI for OR
Variables in the Equation
B
SE
Wald
df
p
OR
Lower
Upper
Competency
1.309
.517
6.402
1
.011
3.704
1.343
10.212
Instructions
5.198
2
.074
No Instructions vs. Instruct + Explain (1)
.767
.491
2.441
1
.118
2.154
.823
5.64
Standard vs. Instruct + Explain (2)
1.121
.510
4.827
1
.028
3.067
1.129
8.333
Competency x Instructions
2.453
2
.293
Competency x Instructions 1
-.213
.770
.077
1
.782
.808
.178
3.657
Competency x Instructions 2
-1.121
.750
2.233
1
.135
.326
.075
1.418
Constant
-.288
.342
.709
1
.400
.750
Note. CI = confidence interval; OR = odds ratio. N = 205. Dummy codes were 0 = NCST; 1 = CST; -1 = No Instructions, 0 = Instructions Only; 1 =
Instructions & Explanation.

Pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal means using the Generalized Linear Model
revealed significant effects of competency status in the No Instructions condition, χ2 (1, N = 205)
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= 4.043, p = .044, OR = 1.235, 95% CI [1.005, 1.517] and the Instructions with Explanation
condition, χ2 (1, N = 205) = 7.395, p = .007, OR = 1.359, 95% CI [1.089, 1.695]. These findings
indicate that information on competency status resulted in a significant difference in the number
of guilty verdicts rendered by participants who either did not hear any instructions from the
judge, or who heard instructions not to consider information on competency as it may create
undue bias. Participants in the no instruction condition gave more guilty verdicts when
participants were initially found competent to stand trial (38.2%) than when they were initially
incompetent to stand trial (17.1%). This pattern was the same for participants in the instruction
and explanation condition, who also gave more guilty verdicts when the defendant was always
competent (57.1%) than when he was initially incompetent (26.5%). This finding is surprising,
as we hypothesized that an explanation of the legal standard and the importance of adhering to
the law would mitigate the effects of competency status. Instead, this outcome was observed in
the Instructions Only condition, as the effect of competency status no longer reached
significance, χ2 (1, N = 205) = .121, p = .728, OR = 1.039, 95% CI [0.837, 1.289]. Participants
who heard instructions alone found the defendant guilty at approximately equal rates regardless
of whether he was always competent to stand trial (30.3%) or whether he was initially
incompetent (26.5%).
Perceptions of Defendant Sanity
Using a univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test, we found a significant main
effect of competency status on juror perceptions of defendant sanity, F (1, 205) = 9.74, p = .002,
d = 0.44, 95% CI [0.203, 0.684]. Participants were more likely to rate a defendant higher on our
scale of legal sanity when they heard the defendant was found competent to stand trial (M = 3.81,
SD = 1.86) than when they heard he was initially found incompetent (M = 3.03, SD = 1.67).
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There was no significant main effect of judicial instructions, F (2, 205) = 1.113, p = .331, ηp2 =
.011.
Contrary to predictions, judicial instructions did not significantly moderate the effect of
competency status, F (2, 205) = 1.382, p = .254, ηp2 = .014. Because of our a priori hypotheses,
we conducted simple effects tests despite the nonsignificant interaction. Competency status
significantly affected juror perceptions of sanity within the No Instruction conditions, F (1, 205)
= 4.237, p = .041, d = 0.517, 95% CI [0.12, 0.91]. Participants who did not hear instructions on
how to consider competency status were more likely to rate a defendant higher on our scale of
legal sanity when he was initially found competent to stand trial (M = 3.63, SD = 1.96) than
when told he was initially found incompetent (M = 2.76, SD = 1.42). In contrast, the judgments
of participants who heard standard instructions to disregard pre-trial competency status were
unaffected by that status, F (1, 205) = .263, p = .608, d = 0.12, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.55]. That is,
after hearing standard instructions from the judge to disregard evidence on competency to stand
trial, participants gave approximately equal ratings of defendant sanity in the CST condition (M
= 3.53, SD = 1.87) and the NCST condition (M = 3.31, SD = 1.68). However, the addition of an
explanation to the instructions undid this effect, with competency status having significant
effects on juror perceptions of sanity in the Instruction plus Explanation conditions, F (1, 205) =
8.142, p = .005, d = 0.676, 95% CI [0.25, 1.1]. Much like those who did not receive judicial
instructions, participants who heard instructions with an explanation were more likely to rate an
initially competent defendant higher on legal sanity (M = 4.25, SD = 1.74) than an initially
incompetent defendant (M = 3.04, SD = 1.89). These findings directly contradicted our
predictions, as judicial instructions without an explanation produced a much larger effect size
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when compared to the no instructions condition, indicating instructions with an explanation
increased the biasing effects of defendant competency status.
Discussion
Our hypothesis regarding defendant competency was supported; we found a main effect
of competency status on guilty verdicts. Participants who learned the defendant was always
competent to stand trial viewed the defendant as less mentally ill and were significantly more
likely to find him guilty than were participants who were told the defendant was initially found
incompetent to stand trial and required restorative treatment before proceeding to trial. These
findings provide evidence to suggest the jurors are conflating these two similar but legally
distinct concepts, creating bias against the competent defendant and for the incompetent
defendant. As previously discussed, it is possible for a defendant who was insane at the time of
the crime to later be found competent to stand trial, and so this bias may have a detrimental
impact on the outcome of their case.
Our hypotheses regarding judicial instructions were partially supported in that
instructions moderated the effects of competency status. However, contrary to our prediction that
instructions with an explanation of the rationale behind the law would successfully debias the
jury, we found that this condition not only failed to remove the biasing effects of competency
status, but actually undid the corrective effects observed with instructions alone. Surprisingly,
there was no significant difference in the mean ratings of defendant sanity from participants in
the instructions only condition, whereas participants who did not hear any instructions displayed
a moderate difference in sanity ratings. These findings indicate that instructions alone are
sufficient to mitigate the biasing effects of competency status, whereas a more-lengthy
explanation may serve to confuse and overwhelm jurors, causing them to rely on salient,
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although irrelevant details from the case. Alternately, it is possible that the explanation served to
place additional emphasis on competency status, thereby increasing its saliency and making
jurors more vulnerable to the effects of hindsight bias.
Practical Implications
Taken together, these findings indicate that jurors are vulnerable to the effects of
evidence fusion and hindsight bias when information on competency to stand trial is introduced
in insanity defense cases. Ideally, this highly biasing information would not be shared with
jurors, but, as all information on a defendant’s mental health history becomes admissible once an
insanity defense has been raised, this solution may not be realistic at this time. Rather, legal
actors and mental health professionals should be sensitive to the biasing effects of this
information and refrain from introducing it whenever possible.
In addition, these findings extend the literature on judicial instructions as a debiasing
technique by providing evidence that instructions on how to appropriately consider particular
information may increase juror adherence to legal standards. However, the finding that judicial
instructions with an explanation failed to mitigate the effect of competency status supports
previous literature that judicial instructions may be too long or confusing for jurors to adequately
comprehend (Ogloff, 1999; Simon, 2012; Smith, 1993; Smith & Greene, 2005; Steblay et al.,
2006). It is also possible that a lengthier discussion of why competency status should be
disregarded served to draw more attention to the topic, therefore making it more salient in the
participants’ minds. This phenomenon has been replicated in previous studies which found that
instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence actually increased its biasing effects (Steblay et
al., 2006). Clearly, further research is necessary to determine the efficacy of judicial instructions
as a debiasing technique.
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Limitations and Future Research
This study was limited in that it was administered in an online format, and as such we
were unable to ensure participants paid adequate attention to the stimulus materials. Although we
excluded participants who did not pass key attention and manipulation checks, it is possible that
participants missed other important information presented in the videos. In addition, our stimulus
presented the trial process in an abbreviated format, which may increase the impact of
competency status. It is possible that the full trial process, with an increase in the amount of
information presented and time elapsed, may decrease the salience of information on
competency to stand trial.
Future research should focus on discovering what factors contributed to increasing the
biasing effect of competency status in the Instructions and Explanation condition when compared
to the Instructions Only condition. It is possible that instructions and explanations which are
simpler, or more general in nature may mitigate this increase in juror bias. Such research would
contribute not only to the body of literature on debiasing instructions, but to the understanding of
juror comprehension in general.
Conclusions
It has been well established in the existing literature that jurors are vulnerable to the
effects of evidence fusion and hindsight bias (Casper et al., 1988; Smith & Greene, 2005; Steblay
et al, 2006). This phenomenon is of particular interest in insanity defense cases, which typically
involve highly vulnerable defendants and highly salient information related to mental status. This
study provides evidence that information on competency to stand trial impacts juror perceptions
of the severity of a defendant’s mental illness such that defendants who were originally
adjudicated competent to stand trial are viewed as less mentally ill and as a result are more likely
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to be found guilty than defendants who were initially found incompetent to stand trial. The
biasing effects of this evidence are mitigated by judicial instructions alone but enhanced by
instructions with an explanation of the legal standards. We hypothesize the instructions serve to
increase the saliency of competency to stand trial by spending more time discussing this
information, but further research is warranted to investigate this theory and reconcile these
findings with previous literature.

COMPETENCE, JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS, AND NGRI VERDICTS

25

References
Arens, R., Granfield, D. D., & Susman, J. (1965). Jurors, jury charges and insanity. Catholic
University Law Review, 14(1), 1–29. Retrieved from
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/cathu14&id
=7&men_tab=srchresults
Berman, L. M., & Osborne, Y. H. (1987). Attorney’s referrals for competency to stand trial
evaluations: Comparisons of referred and non-referred clients. Behavioral Sciences and
the Law, 5(3), 373–380. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2370050310
Bonnie, R. J. & Grisso, T. (2000). Adjudicative competence and youthful offenders. In T. Grisso
& R. G. Schwartz (Eds.), Youth on trial: A developmental perspective on juvenile justice
(pp. 73–103). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Borum, R. & Fulero, S. M. (1999). Empirical research on the insanity defense and attempted
reforms: Evidence toward informed policy, Law and Human Behavior, 23(1), 177–135.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022330908350
Casper, J. D., Benedict, K., & Kelly, J. R. (1988). Cognitions, attitudes and decision-making in
search and seizure cases. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 18(2), 93–113.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1988.tb00008.x
Cullen, H. J. & Monds, L. A. (2020). Jury simulation studies : To exclude or not to exclude
participants based on a lack of comprehension of the case? Applied Cognitive
Psychology, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3695
Dillon, M. K., Jones, A. M., Bergold, A. N., Hui, C. Y. T. & Penrod, S. D. (2017). Henderson
instructions: Do they enhance evidence evaluation? Journal of Forensic Psychology
Research and Practice, 17(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/15228932.2017.1235964
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

COMPETENCE, JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS, AND NGRI VERDICTS

26

Eichhorn, L. (1989). Social science findings and the jury’s ability to disregard evidence under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Law and Contemporary Problems, 52(4), 341–353.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1191918
Elwork, A., Alfini, J., & Sales, B. (1987). Toward understandable jury instructions. In L.
Wrightsman, S. Kassin, & C. Willis (Eds.), In the jury box: Controversies in the
courtroom (pp. 161–179). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight does not equal foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on
judgment under uncertainty, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance, 1(3), 288–299. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.1.3.288
Hoge, S., Bonnie, R. J., Poythress, N., & Monahan, J. (1992). Attorney-client decision-making in
criminal cases: Client competence and participation as perceived by their attorneys.
Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 10(3), 385–394. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2370100308
Kamin, K. A. & Rachlinski, J. J. (1995). Ex post does not equal ex ante: Determining liability in
hindsight. Law and Human Behavior, 19(1), 89–104.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499075
Melton, G. B., Petrila, J., Poythress, N. G., Slobogin, C., Otto, R. K., Mossman, D., & Condie, L.
O. (2018). Psychological evaluations for the courts: A handbook for mental health
professionals and lawyers (4th ed.). New York, NY: The Guilford Press
R v. M’Naghten, 10 Cl. F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)
Ogloff, J. R. P. (1991). A comparison of insanity defense standards on juror decision making.
Law and Human Behavior, 15(5), 509–531. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01650292

COMPETENCE, JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS, AND NGRI VERDICTS

27

Pirelli, G., Gottdiener, W. H., Zapf, P. A., & Roesch, R. (2011). A meta-analytic review of
competency to stand trial research. Psychology, Public Policy, and the Law, 17(1), 1–53.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021713
Reifman, A., Gusick, S. M., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1992). Real jurors’ understanding of the law in
real cases. Law and Human Behavior, 16(5), 539–554.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044622
Simon, D. (2012). More problems with criminal trials: The limited effectiveness of legal
mechanisms. Law and Contemporary Problems, 75(1), 167–209.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2106934
Smith, A. C., & Greene, E. (2005). Conduct and its consequences: Attempts at debiasing jury
judgments. Law and Human Behavior, 29(5), 505–526. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979005-5692-5
Smith, V. L. (1993). When prior knowledge and law collide: Helping jurors use the law. Law
and Human Behavior, 17(5), 507–536. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01045071
Steblay, N., Hosch, H. M., Culhane, S. E. & McWethy, A. (2006). The impact on juror verdicts
of judicial instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence: A meta-analysis. Law and
Human Behavior, 30(4), 469–492. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9039-7
Thomas, C. (2010). Are juries fair? Ministry of Justice Research Series. Retrieved from
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/mojresearch/are-juries-fair-research.pdf
Wissler, R. L., Rector, K. A. & Saks, M. J. (2001). The impact of jury instructions on the fusion
of liability and compensatory damages. Law and Human Behavior, 25(2), 125–139.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005689230013

COMPETENCE, JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS, AND NGRI VERDICTS

28

Appendix
A. Mock Trial Video Script
Judge: Opening Statement (ALL)
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have been selected and sworn as the jury to try the
case of the State of New York against Thomas Howe. You must keep an open mind. Don’t form
any opinions or conclusions with respect to the defendant. It is your duty to base your factual
judgment on the evidence or lack of evidence in the case and your evaluation of the credibility
and weight of the evidence.
I will now read to you some facts about the case. These facts represent a summary of the
information on which both the defense and prosecution agree. That is, that at 1:30 PM on
November 15, 2016, surveillance footage showed that Thomas Howe entered the Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company in New York City. Mr. Howe stood in line for approximately 15
minutes. During this time, he did not interact with anyone else. At one point, he shifted his
posture while standing and the handle of a knife became visible in his pocket. Mr. Howe
approached the teller window at approximately 1:45 PM and handed the teller, Melissa Smith, a
note that said, “Give me money. I require $200.00.” Ms. Smith testified that Mr. Howe was
acting strangely, that she was scared, and that she gave him the money per bank policy. No one
else in the bank noticed that a robbery was taking place. Five minutes later, Mr. Howe left the
bank, at which point Ms. Smith notified the authorities.
The police arrived to the bank around 2 PM and took statements. By comparing
surveillance footage and fingerprints found on the note to DMV records, the police were able to
identify Thomas Howe as the suspect. The police obtained an arrest warrant and took him into
custody that day.
When Thomas Howe was brought into the police station for questioning, he confessed to
robbing the bank. He said he committed the robbery because he believed banks around the world
had been taken over by Hitler’s family and that the banks were stealing money from Jewish
accounts as payback for surviving the Holocaust. Mr. Howe said that after he left the bank, he
went home and ripped up the $200 and then flushed it down the toilet. A plumber was able to
retrieve torn pieces of currency from the pipes that had serial numbers matching the money
stolen from the bank.
Judge: Pre-Trial Motion Summary (CST)
Before trial, Mr. Howe’s attorneys filed a motion to have their client evaluated for
competency to stand trial. Competency is a legal term which addresses whether defendants have
the mental capacity to understand the legal process, the charges against them, and the ability to
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work with their attorney. This standard is put in place to protect a mentally ill defendant from
jeopardizing their freedom due to severe symptoms of their illness.
Mr. Howe was assessed by two independent psychiatrists at Kirby Forensic Psychiatric
Center, who testified that he exhibited signs of schizophrenia. These symptoms included
disorganized and odd speech, flattened emotion, and paranoid delusions. Based on the extent of
his symptoms, the judge concluded that Mr. Howe was competent to stand trial and transferred
him to Riker’s Island to await his court date.
Judge: Pre-Trial Motion Summary (NCST)
Before trial, Mr. Howe’s attorneys filed a motion to have their client evaluated for
competency to stand trial. Competency is a legal term which addresses whether defendants have
the mental capacity to understand the legal process, the charges against them, and the ability to
work with their attorney. This standard is put in place to protect a mentally ill defendant from
jeopardizing their freedom due to severe symptoms of their illness.
Mr. Howe was assessed by two independent psychiatrists at Kirby Forensic Psychiatric
Center, who testified that he exhibited signs of schizophrenia. These symptoms included
disorganized and odd speech, flattened emotion, and paranoid delusions. Based on the extent of
his symptoms, the judge concluded that Mr. Howe was not competent to stand trial and referred
him to treatment in a psychiatric hospital. Mr. Howe was assessed again after a period of 70
days, after which the judge found that Mr. Howe was competent to stand trial and transferred
him to Riker’s Island to await his court date.
Judge: Lawyer Introduction (ALL)
At this point in the trial, the attorneys for both the State and the Defense will offer their
opening statements. Opening statements are not evidence, but instead serve as guides. After the
opening statements, several expert witnesses will take the stand and offer their professional
opinions on the case. After the People and the defense both rest, each side may make a closing
argument. Closing arguments are not evidence and are presented for the purpose of persuasion
only.
Prosecutor: Opening Statement (ALL)
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is David Jones, and I am representing the
State of New York. The defendant, Thomas Howe is on trial for the crime of robbing a bank by
force on November 15, 2011. What we intend to show in this case is that the defendant
knowingly and willfully robbed the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. What we intend to
show in this case is that the defendant planned a visit to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company on that day to steal money from the bank, even bringing along a knife to help him
carry out the act. Mr. Howe went into the bank, stood in line, and then handed the bank teller a
note demanding money. He took the money, rushed out of the bank, and then hurried home to
avoid the police. When the police showed up anyway, Mr. Howe, fearing the repercussions of
being found with the money, ripped the money to shreds and flushed it down the toilet.
You will hear evidence that although Mr. Howe has been diagnosed with schizophrenia,
he was perfectly able to understand his actions. His mental illness, ladies and gentlemen, did not
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impair his ability at the time that he robbed the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. That was
a decision that he made, fully conscious of what was happening. He made a plan and executed it
of his own volition.
The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity. I believe you will find
evidence to support this defense to be insufficient. At the conclusion of all of the evidence, I will
ask you to hold the defendant accountable for his actions. Thank you.
Defense: Opening Statement (ALL)
Good morning. This case is about thirteen years of deterioration of a young man’s mind.
Ladies and gentlemen, this all began with a head injury at age 16. Before that time, Mr. Howe
was a bright child, popular, outgoing, and gifted in school. But after that injury, Thomas Howe
has slipped further and further into mental illness.
Thomas Howe is not a bad man. He is a very sick, mentally ill young man. The central
issue in this case is Mr. Howe's state of mind at the moment that he passed the note to Ms. Smith
and subsequently took the money. That day, November 15, 2011, we know that Mr. Howe's
judgment and insight were poor. On this particular day, he was not in touch with reality. He
thought the bank was stealing money from Jewish people. He felt it was his duty to retrieve the
money that had been wrongly taken. And then, to prevent the bank from getting the money back
or it being used wrongly in the future, Mr. Howe ripped the money up and flushed it down the
toilet. Those are not the actions of a man who is seeking to steal money for his own gain.
Mr. Howe simply cannot be found guilty for committing a crime that he did not know he
was committing and was not capable of understanding due to his delusions. I plan to prove that
Thomas Howe is not responsible, not because it’s an easy conclusion to reach, but because it’s
the right conclusion. Thank you.
MH Information (ALL)
You will now hear an extract from the testimony of Dr. Donald Randall, head of the psychiatry
department at St. Vincent’s Hospital. Dr. Randall is an expert on Schizophrenia and assessed
Mr. Howe two weeks before the robbery took place.
Defense: Dr. Randall, did you evaluate Mr. Thomas Howe on October 30th, 2011?
Randall: Yes, he was brought in for a psychiatric evaluation by his mother who seemed
very concerned for his wellbeing. I immediately noticed his disorganized behavior. He seemed
distracted and unresponsive to my questions. He was staring into space, grabbing at air, knocking
his knees together, and seemed agitated and defensive.
Defense: Dr. Randall, what was your diagnosis for Mr. Howe?
Randall: Well, after completing a thorough evaluation it became apparent to me that Mr.
Howe suffers from an illness known as schizophrenia.
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Defense: Now Dr., I want to ask you in very general terms, please describe for this jury
what is schizophrenia?
Randall: Okay. Schizophrenia is a brain disease that causes mental symptoms. It results
in severe disruption of almost all mental functioning and is considered perhaps the most serious
of all mental illnesses. The core symptoms include hallucinations, which are perceptions that
have no basis in reality, such as hearing voices when no one is there or seeing images or visions
when nothing is in front of your eyes. These are considered very serious symptoms of psychosis.
Another core symptom is experiencing delusions, which are false, fixed beliefs that are held with
very strong conviction, even though they have no basis in reality. An example of a delusion is a
paranoid thought that somebody is trying to kill you. Another core symptom is thought disorder.
Patients with schizophrenia say that they can’t get their thoughts straight, they can’t think
properly or reach logical conclusions. They get confused and their speech is often hard to
understand or illogical because their thoughts are jumbled.
Defense Expert – NGRI (ALL)
You will now hear an extract of testimony by Dr. Spencer Wilson. Dr. Wilson is a Professor of
Psychology at New York University (NYU) and Clinical Director of the Psychology Department
at Bellevue Hospital in New York City. Dr. Wilson holds a B.A. in Psychology from Johns
Hopkins and a PhD in Clinical Psychology from Harvard University.
Defense: And did you give Mr. Howe a diagnosis after your evaluation?
Wilson: Yes, I gave him the diagnosis of Schizophrenia, chronic and undifferentiated.
Defense: And you said you reviewed documents related to the offense… What was
significant in the police records?
Wilson: According to the statement by the bank teller, Mr. Howe was behaving strangely
and making her feel nervous. At some point after his arrival home, he ripped up the money and
flushed it down the toilet. During interrogation, Mr. Howe reported that he took the money
because of a conspiracy against the Jewish people. He apparently believed that the banks were
stealing money from Jewish bank accounts as payback for surviving the Holocaust.
Defense: And what does this behavior tell you?
Wilson: It indicates that Mr. Howe was in the middle of an episode where he was having
difficulty thinking coherent thoughts. Mr. Howe’s behavior during the episode was not logical or
rational.
Defense: And what did Mr. Howe say when you asked him why he took the money?
Wilson: He was defensive when I spoke with him. He kept refusing to answer my
questions and referring me to his lawyer instead. However, he did indicate that he knew he stole
the money from the bank.
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Defense: Is it common that individuals raising the insanity defense would be defensive
during the interview?
Wilson: Yes, if part of the mental illness includes paranoia. And from the records it
appears that has been a feature of Mr. Howe’s mental illness for many years. It would be
consistent with paranoia to avoid answering questions that he feels may harm him.
Defense: Can you judge whether somebody was likely to appreciate the wrongfulness of
their actions?
Wilson: We have to look at Mr. Howe’s behavior at the time of the alleged offense, it
suggests that Mr. Howe did not think that what he was doing was wrong. Mr. Howe requested a
very small amount of money, that kind of odd behavior is very typical of psychotic thinking. If
Mr. Howe was robbing the bank for his own gain I would expect him to request a much higher
amount. Instead, given his delusion about the Jewish people, it appears Mr. Howe believed that
what he was doing was right, that he was providing proper compensation for a group of people
who had been wronged.
Defense: And is it rational behavior to steal money and flush it down the toilet?
Wilson: No, it is not. It is further evidence of Mr. Howe’s psychotic thinking at the time
of the alleged offense.
Defense: Can you render an opinion with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty
whether this mental illness significantly impacted Mr. Howe’s appreciation of the wrongfulness
of his actions the day of the alleged offense?
Wilson: Yes, it is my opinion that Mr. Howe was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his actions on the day in question because he was operating under a major mental illness.
Defense: And what is the basis for that opinion?
Wilson: The core question is how much Mr. Howe’s delusions factored into his
understanding of wrongfulness. This delusion about the Jewish bank accounts lead to Mr.
Howe’s behavior and interfered with his ability to appreciate that his behavior was wrong. He
thought was protecting the Jewish people, and so he felt his behavior was morally justified.
Defense: Thank you Dr. Wilson, nothing further.
Prosecution Expert – Guilty (ALL)
You will now hear an extract of testimony by Dr. Edward Jones. Dr. Jones is a Professor of
Psychology at Columbia University and Clinical Director of the Psychology Department at
Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City. Dr. Jones holds a B.A. in Psychology from Cornell and
a PhD in Clinical Psychology from Yale.
Prosecution: For what issue were you retained in this particular case?
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Jones: I was retained by the state to evaluate the defendant and come to an expert opinion
as to his criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged bank robbery.
Prosecutor: And with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, did you reach an opinion
as to the defendant’s awareness of his acts at the time when he robbed the bank and whether he
knew that it was right or wrong?
Jones: Yes.
Prosecutor: And can you tell us with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty what you
opinion was or is?
Jones: I believe that Mr. Howe fully understood the nature and consequences of his
actions on that date at that time.
Prosecutor: What is your opinion as to whether he knew that it was wrong?
Jones: I feel that he did know that it was wrong.
Prosecutor: And did you arrive at a diagnosis for Mr. Howe?
Jones: Yes, I agreed with the diagnosis of chronic, undifferentiated schizophrenia.
Prosecutor: And does having a diagnosis or schizophrenia necessarily mean that person is
unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his actions or know that his actions are wrong?
Jones: Absolutely not. Many, many factors play into whether someone would be unable
to appreciate their actions. You would have to consider the type and severity of the symptoms
the person is suffering from.
Prosecutor: And are you aware of the symptoms that Dr. Wilson discussed earlier?
Jones: Yes, he mentioned auditory and visual hallucinations, repetitive behaviors and
lack of emotions. He also characterized Mr. Howe’s unwillingness to cooperate as a sign of
paranoia.
Prosecutor: To a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, can you tell us if there are
alternative explanations for these behaviors?
Jones: Well, I do not think that anyone disagrees that Mr. Howe has a mental illness. The
part I question is the extent to which the disease impacted his behavior. Mr. Howe refused to
cooperate during the interview. He repeatedly referred me to his attorney and said that his
attorney is there to prevent him from getting hurt. That signifies to me that Mr. Howe knew what
he was doing was wrong and was purposefully not cooperating to avoid getting into trouble.
Prosecutor: And did a time come when he talked about taking money from the bank?
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Jones: Well as I said, Mr. Howe largely refused to cooperate. Mr. Howe did tell me that
he took the money because he needed the money, and that he felt good about it. He did not
mention the Jewish people or a conspiracy at any point during our two meetings together.
Prosecutor: You did say that you reviewed accounts of the crime, correct?
Jones: Yes, I reviewed the police report.
Prosecutor: And to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, were there any behaviors
described in the police report which suggest Mr. Howe was aware of his actions and able to
appreciate the wrongfulness of what he was doing?
Jones: I believe so. See, Mr. Howe brought a knife to the bank, which suggests to me that
he was aware there may be a degree of resistance in taking the money. This would indicate that
he knew his actions were wrong. Mr. Howe then rushed out of the bank after the robbery and
went straight home, indicating that he appreciated what he was doing was wrong and wanted to
avoid capture. I think Mr. Howe’s efforts to avoid apprehension show that he did not feel
justified in his actions and wanted to avoid capture for breaking the law. Mr. Howe also ripped
up the money and flushed it down the toilet. Mr. Howe, in my opinion, was trying to hide the
evidence of what he had done, which is consistent with the rest of his post-robbery behavior. Mr.
Howe could have tried to return the money to the rightful owner, but he instead chose to destroy
it. That suggests he knew there was no rightful owner in the first place. He knew it was not his
money and he did not attempt to return the money to anyone else. He stole it for his own gain but
destroyed it when he thought he might get caught.
Prosecutor: Do you have an opinion as to whether Mr. Howe’s delusions are genuine?
Jones: I believe Mr. Howe’s delusions are genuine, but that still does not mean Mr. Howe
is not responsible. People with delusions can still understand right from wrong. Delusional
thinking does not impair the ability to acknowledge that the money was the bank’s and not his
own. It is a big leap in logic that the next step in Mr. Howe’s delusion that it is his job to take the
money and destroy it. We simply cannot blame his behavior on his delusion. Just because
somebody commits a poorly thought out crime does not mean they did not understand that they
were committing the crime.
Prosecutor: Thank you, no further questions.
Lawyers’ Closing Statements (ALL)
Now that both sides have presented their evidence, you will hear the closing arguments from
both the defense and the prosecution. Each side will take this opportunity to summarize their
arguments and attempt to sway your opinion.
Prosecution: Thomas Howe is mentally ill. However, as you witnessed during the
presentation of the evidence, he still knew right from wrong. He planned this act by writing the
note demanding money before he walked into the bank, and by bringing a weapon. He wanted
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money, and he got it. He clearly knew what he did was wrong because he tried to destroy the
evidence of his crime. Thomas Howe is claiming he couldn’t control himself because he thinks
he can get away with it. He has a mental illness yes, but his behaviors show he knew right from
wrong. He knew it was wrong to steal money because he ran from the bank. He knew it was
wrong to steal money because he ripped it up and flushed it down the toilet to hide it from the
police. A man who didn’t think he was doing wrong would not have done those things. With
people like Thomas how abusing the system in this way, how can we protect our citizens? He
needs to be found responsible for this crime. Thank you.
Defense: Ladies and Gentleman, Thomas Howe has schizophrenia. He has received this
diagnosis from Dr. Donald Randall, and he has the classic symptoms of this disease. As his
illness has become progressively worse, Mr. Howe has had difficulty maintaining employment
and basic functioning that we all take for granted. His mother took him for evaluation just two
weeks before this incident, when she felt his symptoms were getting worse. The law states that a
person is not responsible for their actions if they do not comprehend the nature and the
consequences of their action, or if they do not know that action is wrong. At the time of the event
at the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Thomas Howe did not know the nature of his
actions. He thought he was doing the right thing, the moral thing. He did not understand that he
would be condemned for taking back money he thought rightfully belonged to the Jewish people.
It would be unlawful to find Thomas Howe responsible for these actions. This was an
unfortunate event, but Thomas Howe belongs in a hospital where he can get help. Not in a prison
cell. Thank you.
Closing Statement (ALL)
Jurors, before you deliberate I have to explain the rules of law. You are the judges of the
facts and it is your sworn duty to make your factual determinations based on the evidence in the
case. Follow the law as I instruct you and not just what you might personally think is just. Now
you may have sympathies, acknowledge them, and put these feelings and opinions aside. The
value of the evidence is a factual question for you the jury. If you find the evidence credible, you
must give it whatever weight you consider appropriate.
The defendant has raised the affirmative defense that he is not criminally responsible by
reason of mental disease or defect. The defense has the burden of proving this lack of criminal
responsibility. The defense must prove that the defendant was not criminally responsible by what
we call a preponderance of the evidence. This defense is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence when the jury is satisfied that the evidence of lack of criminal responsibility outweighs
and is more convincing than the evidence that he was criminally responsible when he committed
the crime. This does not require evidence beyond all reasonable doubt.
(INST & INST+EXP)
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In determining whether the defendant has proven the affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, you may consider evidence introduced by the People or by the
defendant, including but not limited to:
– opinions of psychiatric witnesses
– prior hospitalizations of the defendant
– hospital and other medical records
– the nature and manner in which the crime was committed
When making your decision, you are to disregard all evidence related to the defendant’s
mental state during his incarceration, including the ruling on his competency to stand trial. This
information is not relevant to the question of criminal responsibility, as the law is only concerned
with his mental state at the time of committing the offense.
(INST+EXP ONLY)
This is important information on the defendant’s competency status could bias your
decision and result in a miscarriage of justice. If you develop biases against the defendant, you
might unduly punish him by finding him guilty and sending him to prison. If you develop biases
that favor the defendant, you might show him too much leniency, which would prevent the legal
system from administering punitive and deterrent measures, while also denying the victims the
justice they deserve.
Closing Statements Cont. (ALL)
Again, it is your duty as jurors to be open-minded. Each of you must decide the case for
yourself, but only after impartial consideration of the evidence. Thank you.
B. Survey
Imagine you are a juror on this case. Considering all the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense, what verdict would you give to the defendant?

o Guilty
o Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
Please click "next" when you are ready to continue.
You cannot return to this page.

Reasons Guilty/NGRI
You voted to find the defendant guilty/NGRI. Please answer the following questions on your
opinions and impressions about the case.

On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely) please indicate the extent to which you agree with
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the following statements:
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The defendant was able to control his
behavior.

The defendant understood that his actions
were wrong.

The crime was a direct result of the
defendant’s mental illness.

The defendant understood the consequences
of his actions.

The defendant has a serious mental illness.

Please click "next" when you are ready to continue.
You cannot return to this page.
Please answer the following questions on your opinions and perceptions of the case.
1. With what crime was the defendant charged?
Breaking and Entering
Robbery

Murder

Shoplifting

2. At the beginning of trial, the judge said the defendant was evaluated for competency to
stand trial. At that time, was he found:
Competent
Incompetent
3. With what mental illness was the defendant diagnosed?
Depression
Anxiety
Schizophrenia

OCD

4. Which of the following instructions did you receive from the judge? Select all that apply.
a. Jurors must be unbiased when making their decisions.
b. Jurors must determine whether they are convinced based on a preponderance of
the evidence.
c. Jurors should not consider information on competency to stand trial when making
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their decision.
d. Information on competency might create unfair biases for or against the
defendant.
Please click "next" when you are ready to continue.
You cannot return to this page.
Demographics
Finally, please tell us a little about yourself.
1. What is your age?
________________________________________________________________
2. What gender do you identify with?

o Female
o Male
o Other ________________________________________________
3. With which race or ethnicity do you most closely identify?

o American Indian or Alaskan Native
o Asian
o Black or African American
o Hispanic, Latino, or Latina
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
o White or European American
o Other ________________________________________________
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4. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?

o Less than high school
o High School degree or equivalent
o Some college or trade school
o College or trade school degree
o Post graduate degree
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